

# 7 Repression or reform?

## An analysis of the AKP's Kurdish language policy

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### Introduction

In Turkey, the language policy of the Turkish elite can be said to have had a dual role: first, modernising, purifying, and secularizing the Turkish language; second, eradicating non-Turkish languages and establishing the dominance of Turkish in all arenas of life. In this chapter, I will specifically consider the second aspect of this policy.<sup>1</sup> The strategy of placing Turkish at the heart of Turkish modernity and nation-building, while annihilating other languages, has not only politicised the issue of language, it has also transformed the Turkish language into a fundamental aspect of Turkish existence, making it an unquestionable entity. Thus, linguistic rights in Turkey have been dominated and interpreted through a highly politicised and securitised scope, and conspiracy theories abound (Guida 2008). As an essential aspect of this language policy, the Turkish language in its 'purified' form has had the full support and backing of the Turkish state since its inception, while the other languages of Turkey have not only been neglected, but actively persecuted and suppressed, resulting in a significant loss of the linguistic and cultural diversity inherited from the Ottoman Empire. These systematic efforts to homogenise have resulted in a large section of the non-Turkish population being either forcibly expelled or assimilated, and they have also generated deep resentment and mobilisation around minority and linguistic rights that continues to inform the Kurdish question and minority rights in Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

The Turkish policy of monolingualism has even been lauded as a 'great success' by certain scholars who consider it an unavoidable aspect of modernity and nation-building or part of the natural process of 'acculturation' (see for example Heper 2007; Lewis 1999; for a discussion, see Üngör 2012: 129–30). In this chapter, following scholars such as Skutnabb-Kangas, Hassanpour and others, I argue that the linguistic policies of the Turkish state have been, and continue to amount to, 'linguistic genocide' or 'linguicide': namely the deliberate extermination of a language (Hassanpour 1992, 1993, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1995; Hassanpour, Skutnabb-Kangas and Chyet 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas and Philipson, 1994; Skutnabb-Kangas

2000, 2005; Skutnabb-Kangas and Fernandes 2008). As Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak explain with regards to Turkey's policy towards the Kurds, 'To kill a language you have to either kill the individuals speaking it or make these individuals change their mother tongue. Turkey tries to change the mother tongue of the Kurds and make Turkish their mother tongue' (1995: 362). Here, the emphasis is on the role of the nation-state as the primary agent in the active and systematic pursuit of monolingualism within its borders, resulting in linguicide. The term 'linguicide' is favoured here, instead of terms such as 'language death' or 'language loss' in order not to dislocate the agency of the nation-state and its institutions, and to emphasise the link between linguicide and genocide (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000, 2001).

The issue of linguistic rights continues to remain on Turkey's political agenda today, as it did when the republic was founded in 1923. The demand for linguistic rights by Kurds has posed a great challenge to the Turkish establishment who has traditionally suppressed them and interpreted such demands as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey. For example, on 7 February 2012, speaking to the CNN Türk TV Channel on the issue of language rights for the Kurds, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç asked the following revealing questions:

Would education in Kurdish be as effective as education in Turkish? Turkish is a language of civilisation, but is Kurdish a language of civilisation? Kurdish can become an elective course but we cannot have Kurdish as the language of education from primary school to universities.<sup>3</sup>

More recently, on 9 October 2012, addressing a parliamentary meeting of his Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*), Turkey's long serving Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, strictly ruled out public education in Kurdish by noting that, 'there is no such thing as education in the mother tongue. Our country's official language is Turkish.' Erdoğan added that such demands were not sincere, and that 'the separatist terrorist organisation PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party, *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*]', was exploiting this issue (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2012). No one present at the meeting thought to question the Prime Minister on why the two issues – namely, public education in Kurdish and in the official language of Turkey – were mutually exclusive. Interestingly enough, just a year earlier, during an official visit to Germany, Erdoğan made a speech to thousands of Turks, in which he urged them to 'integrate' into German society but not to 'assimilate': 'Yes, integrate yourselves into German society but don't assimilate yourselves. No one has the right to deprive us of our culture and our identity' (Gezer and Reimann 2011). The official demonizing approach to linguistic demands was best displayed by Burhan Kuzu, chair of the Constitutional Commission of the Turkish Grand Assembly and Istanbul MP of the AKP, who warned the general Turkish public in a speech on

19 October 2012 that yielding to the demands of public education in Kurdish would literally mean ‘yielding to the devil’ (*Radikal* 2012a).

The above statements are of great interest for several reasons. First, they clearly reveal that the issue of language continues to be of central importance in Turkish politics. They also warrant attention coming from the new ruling elite of a country that is a candidate for membership in the European Union and has committed itself to enhance democracy and to respect minority and human rights, and which has pledged to respond to the grievances of ‘citizens of Kurdish origin’. During the past few years, the AKP government has not only been praised for decreasing the influence of the powerful Turkish military, improving Turkey’s economy, and becoming a ‘role model’ for fledgling states in the region, it has also been lauded for carrying out ‘brave’ reforms and taking serious steps in solving the Kurdish question, such as establishing the first state TV channel broadcasting completely in Kurdish. Yet how can a government lauded for its brave Kurdish initiative find Kurds’ demands for greater linguistic rights so offensive? As the republic enters its ninetieth year, why do politicians of a ‘progressive’ party still feel the need to reaffirm the boundaries of Turkish national identity, reflecting an ideology that has informed language policy since the 1920s? These conflicting images require further examination, and in this chapter I will review the AKP’s policies and reforms with specific regard to the Kurdish language, and more generally with respect to the Kurdish question in Turkey. What has been achieved during the decade-long rule of the AKP, in which there have been various reform packages, and how have these been implemented? The following sections sheds light on some of the above questions and attempt to understand the language policies of the AKP as part of the overall Kurdish language policy of the Turkish state.

### **A historical overview of Turkey’s Kurdish language policy**

Throughout the modern history of Turkey, the ruling nationalist elite have been deeply concerned with the issue of language and its planning. Since the creation of the Republic of Turkey, language has been the crucial ingredient in the construction of the modern Turkish identity and the primary marker of what it means to be a Turk. From early on, being able to speak Turkish has been intimately linked to the notion of being a Turk and being a ‘civilised’ citizen of the republic. In the words of the country’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, ‘One very obvious element of nationality is language. A person who claims to be of the Turkish nation, first of all must unconditionally speak Turkish. It would not be correct to believe anyone who claims allegiance to Turkish culture and society but does not speak Turkish’ (quoted in Üngör 2012: 133). According to the Turkish nationalist policy-makers, what defines a modern nation is that it speaks the same language, and that one language dominates all aspects of life. As such, the multilingual complexity of the society they inherited after the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire posed a great obstacle to the nation-building project. This is despite the fact that the inherited linguistic geography was significantly less diverse as a direct result of the Armenian genocide (1915–17), the migration of millions of Turks and Greeks across borders, as well as various wars, massacres, and forced population settlements that the various peoples of the region experienced at the hands of the authorities during the last traumatic decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, following the establishment of the Republic, there still remained a multitude of languages and identities that posed a serious challenge to the Turkish nationalist elite's vision of complete linguistic and ethnic homogeneity. As Üngör has clearly outlined:

When they launched their campaigns for cultural and linguistic homogenization, languages such as Kurdish, Circassian, Arabic, Syrian-Aramaic, Zazaki, Laz and others were widely spoken in the eastern provinces. Kurmancî was a *lingua franca* in the countryside east of the Euphrates, Dersim spoke largely Zazaki and Tur Abdin Syrian-Aramaic, and on the streets of cities such as Siirt and Mardin a dialect of Arabic was spoken. In other words, on entire swaths of land Turkish was hardly understood.

(2012: 133)

At its core, the nationalist project of nation-building considered linguistic diversity not only a threat to the emergence of the much-needed 'national consciousness', vital for the making of a homogenous nation, but also an anachronism that represented the old Ottoman order of decentralisation, fragmentation, primitiveness, and disorder. For the Turkish nationalist elite, strongly influenced by the discourses of enlightenment, orientalism, and contemporary European fascism (Zeydanlıoğlu 2007, 2008), but also deeply traumatised by the painful fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire with the gradual loss of land through ethnic secessions and 'external meddling', achieving ethnic and linguistic unity through the official policy of monolingualism was essential to become a strong, united, and civilised nation (Yıldız, 2001). In the words of Ziya Gökalp, one of the forefathers of Turkish nationalism, 'today in Europe only those states which are based on a single-language group are believed to have a future' (quoted in Zeydanlıoğlu 2012: 100). The core policies of the nation-building project can be summed up under the term 'turkification', aimed at ethnically, culturally, and linguistically assimilating the various ethno-religious groups within the modern borders of Turkey into 'Turks'. Since its inception, all institutions of the Republic have been geared towards the aim of the creation a westernised, secular, nationalist, and homogenous nation of Turkish speakers.

Historically, the primary target of turkification has been the Kurds, the second largest ethnic group in Turkey.<sup>4</sup> Targeting the Kurdish language<sup>5</sup> became the most important aspect of turkification, since it is the clearest and most radical difference between Turks and Kurds, who otherwise share

religious traditions, with no direct possibility of observing physical differences (Haig 2004: 7). The language thus carried the primary burden as a mark of otherness. Kurds were promised a state of their own in the Sèvres Treaty in 1920 but this was superseded and denied in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923,<sup>6</sup> which established the borders of modern Turkey and secured its sovereignty. As such, in the first decades of the Republic, eliminating the Kurdish language would not only remove the emergence of a competing alternative Kurdish nation and nationalism, but also by default pave the way more smoothly for the making of the modern Turkish nation. Thus, the making of modern Turkey went hand in hand with forgetting, denying, and suppressing the Kurds, including their ethnic identity and language, despite Turkey's commitment to international treaties and laws (minorities' linguistic rights were in fact protected by the Lausanne Treaty, article 38–39).<sup>7</sup> Due to decades of turkification policies, the Kurds have been among the main victims of the Kemalist nation-building project, having their language, ethnicity, and homeland rendered 'invisible',<sup>8</sup> and in fact their very existence denied.

Kurdish rebellions against turkification policies dominated the first three decades of the Republic, and these uprisings further convinced Turkish nation-builders that monolingualism, forced assimilation, and population resettlement would dilute Kurdish social cohesion and dampen Kurdish nationalist sentiments. Subsequently, major military operations were carried out against Kurdish populations, followed by large-scale massacres and resettlement programs (van Bruinessen 1994). In tandem, Kurds were systematically represented through an ethno-colonial vision of Turkish Orientalism as backward, culturally inferior, as pawns of foreign powers, smugglers, simple ignorant peasants oppressed by feudal landlords, and as remnants of pre-modernity (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2007, 2008). The Kurdish language was banned, and those who spoke it were punished and fined (Bayrak 1993: 486–87). Between 1940 and 2000, more than 12,000 villages – or approximately every third village in Turkey had its original Kurdish, Laz, Greek, or Armenian name changed to a Turkish one (Tunçel 2000). All constitutions have since included the provision that 'Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk'. All knowledge produced about the Kurds was controlled by the state and created with the aim of assimilating them. 'Scientific' theories were developed to prove the superiority of the 'Turkish race' and to deny the existence, language, culture, and heritage of the Kurds to prevent the emergence of an alternative Kurdish nationalism (Beşikçi 1997; Ersanlı 2003). Thus, the Kurds as a separate people or nation, with Kurdish as their language and Kurdistan as their homeland, were denied or ceased to exist, and all documents, archives, maps, and historical artefacts were changed accordingly or destroyed. For the nationalist Kemalist elite, the Kurdish language represented the past, the primitive, the uncivilised, the archaic, the illiterate, and the periphery, none of which had a place in modern Turkey.

Such policies remained unchanged with each military coup (1960, 1971, and 1980) that further consolidated the dominance of Turkish nationalism and jingoistic militarism as the hegemonic ideology and of the accompanying policy of systematic persecution and suppression of the basic rights of Kurds. However, despite severe restrictions, a Kurdish opposition has increasingly grown since the early 1970s, as witnessed by various political and cultural organisations that have demanded greater rights for Kurds. The state's deep intolerance to simple and basic Kurdish demands and heavy-handed military measures have assisted the mobilisation of the Kurdish national movement, peaking with rise of the PKK, which has carried out an armed struggle against Turkey since 1984.

It is perhaps not a coincidence the PKK, which is outlawed in Turkey and considered a terrorist organisation, launched its armed struggle at a time when the brutal linguistic policies against the Kurds peaked with the 1980 military coup that sought to eliminate all 'enemies within' and rejuvenate 'the Kemalist spirit'. The military government severely cracked down on all dissident activity and, in the new 1982 Constitution, banned the Kurdish language. The 1982 Constitution, which is still Turkey's Constitution today, contained a heavy emphasis on Turkish nationalism, the supremacy of the Turkish language and ethnicity, and Turkey's 'indivisibility', with various provisions banning languages that are 'prohibited by law' from being used in the expression and dissemination of thought (Article 26), and decreeing that 'no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education'.<sup>9</sup> These 'prohibited languages' were regulated in Law 2932, which stipulates that 'the mother tongue of Turkish citizens is Turkish' (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1995: 355–56). The same law clarifies that those prohibited languages were 'languages other than those which are the primary official languages of states recognised by the Turkish State'. The 1982 Law on Political Parties, which remains in force today, makes the policy perfectly clear, specifying that political parties cannot 'claim that there exist minorities in Turkey. It is forbidden to protect or develop non-Turkish cultures and languages' (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1995: 356).<sup>10</sup>

The practical outcome of this type of legislation was most brutally experienced by the Kurdish prisoners in the famous Diyarbakır Military Prison, which in practice functioned as a concentration camp built with the purpose of 'turkifying' Kurdish prisoners through torture. The prisoners were 'welcomed' with a large sign at the entrance that read: 'Speak Turkish, speak it a lot' (*Türkçe konuş, çok konuş*) (Zeydanlıoğlu 2009). As the former prisoner Selahattin Bulut reminisces:

There was an old man in Cell 8 and his voice was always echoing in my ear; 'I am a Turk, I am a son of a Turk. I am a Turk, I am a son of a Turk.' The same voice, in the same tone, could repeatedly be heard. One day, the cell doors opened so that we could clean out the water in the

cell. Again I heard that voice: 'I am a Turk, I am a son of a Turk ... ' I raised my head; a man was standing in the corner. We were not allowed to look but I looked anyway and it was the muhtar from Derik, who stood in front of me and to whom the voice belonged. I used to know him from the outside. He was around 65 years old. His name was Ismail. I wondered why they had brought him in as well. They had beaten him severely for being old, illiterate and for speaking very little Turkish, but they still had not been able to teach him to sing the military songs by heart. They had to have him say something, so they had him saying 'I am a Turk, I am a son of a Turk.' And so he repeated it constantly.

(quoted in Zeydanhoğlu 2009: 82)

Although, with the return to civilian rule in the mid-1980s, there was some limited easing of the prohibition on the Kurdish language, the 'mild' climate did not last long, as clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK intensified in the 1990s, with the Turkish army raking through the Kurdish provinces with its scorched-earth counter-insurgency policy. Law 2932 on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish (1983) was repealed in 1991, but Anti-Terror Law 3713, with its all-encompassing interpretation of 'terrorism', covered anyone promoting Kurdish language or culture, charging them with 'verbal and written propaganda [that] aims to destroy the national unity and the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic'.<sup>11</sup> Yet, with a full-scale insurgency able to mobilise large swathes of the Kurdish geography, the Turkish authorities could no longer blatantly deny the existence of the Kurds and the Kurdish language, and they were forced to publicly, but not legally, recognise the Kurds as a separate ethnicity. Despite the repeal of Law 2932, the limitations placed on the use of the Kurdish language remained largely unchanged in reality. At a local level, state officials resisted policy changes, leading to further tension and conflict. Moreover, laws regulating political parties, provincial administration, election and voter registries, as well as education and teaching all continued to prohibit the Kurdish language. For example, Turkey's Constitutional Court closed the pro-Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Party (*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi*, ÖZDEP) in 1994 for promoting the separation of Turkey along ethnic lines. Similarly, the pro-Kurdish party Democratic Mass Party (*Demokratik Kitle Partisi*, DKP) was dissolved in 1999 according to the Law on Political Parties. The court's ruling argued that, whilst the expression of ethnic identity was not forbidden, the party had aligned itself with a regional and racial ideology that created ethnic and linguistic divisions within the country that did not otherwise exist. The DKP had promoted separatism through its demands for self-determination for the so-called 'Kurdish people'. It was openly stated that Turkey had only one national culture, and reference was made to simplistic, local languages holding people back from self-improvement (Eraydın-Virtanen 2003; see also Koğacıoğlu 2004).

During the 1990s, although the existence of Kurds now was not overtly denied, and indeed the Kurdish language was no longer officially banned, this 'recognition' remained highly problematic. Policies of monolingualism, the ongoing armed conflict, and biased reporting in the media (see Erdem in this volume) led to the use of Kurdish becoming a divisive issue for many Turks. This is primarily because the 'recognition' of the existence of the Kurdish language did not come about as a genuine reform and reconciliation process and through the granting of official status to the Kurds and their language in Turkey, but because it had become impossible to maintain the official paradigm of denial by the early 1990s. The transformation of the Kurds from 'Mountain Turks' into 'Kurds' was forced upon Turkish official discourse, creating a deep cavity in the hegemony of the monolithic Kemalist notions of 'Turkishness' and of the 'indivisibility' of the 'Turkish state with its nation'. The 'recognition', or the impossibility of denying, the multi-ethnic character of Turkey, also took the form of politicians sporadically, depending on the discursive context, 'admitting' that there were 'Kurds', 'Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, or 'our Kurdish brothers', and the media also started to use the words 'Kurds' and the 'Kurdish question'. However, there was no serious policy change, and legal amendments and reforms, which made no explicit reference to Kurds or the Kurdish language, were more of a damage-control reflex than a genuine step in a democratisation process.

Thus, it can be argued that the official policy of denying the existence of Kurds has eased to a certain extent since the early 1990s, but only because it has become impossible to continue in the face of Kurdish mobilisation and the ongoing civil-war, as well as other global transformations, and not because of a genuine democratic reform process. This has made Turkey's current relationship with the Kurds and Kurdish rights highly problematic and contradictory, with old and new policies running contrapuntally. However, what is important to note is that this new 'recognition' has not resulted in the granting of fundamental linguistic rights, but instead co-exists with old discourses of denial and denigration. For example, in 2011, as Prime Minister Erdoğan was recognising the brutal massacres of Kurds that followed the crushing of the Dersim rebellion in the 1930s (BBC News 2011), Turkey's former Chief of General Staff published a book titled 'The End of Terrorist Organisations'. In the book he emphasised that there was no such thing as the 'Kurdish question', that the Kurds in Turkey face no discrimination based on their ethnicity, and that there has been no policy of assimilation in Turkey. The former General concluded that Kurdish is a language dominated by Farsi, with the Zazaki dialect of Kurdish consisting mostly of Turkish words (Başbuğ 2011). This is all while Turkey's Work and Social Security Minister, Faruk Çelik, was complaining during a visit to a private school that the Turkish state 'had not managed to teach Turkish to our Kurdish brothers during the past 70 years' (Bianet 2011a).

### **Linguistic reforms during AKP rule**

As part of Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, which became formalised in 1999, and with the first membership/accession negotiations in 2004, Turkey has carried out certain reforms to meet EU requirements. These have at times resulted in the gradual easing of the country's repressive Kurdish language policy. Reforms initiated by the coalition government in 2000 and 2001 were accelerated under the rule of the AKP, which has been in power in Turkey since 2002 and has its roots in the Turkish Islamist movement. AKP officials often highlight the numerous Kurdish rights granted under their administration, and they boast that the Kurdish language has never been freer in the history of modern Turkey. Reforms have indeed taken place, yet when looking at the reality on the ground, it quickly becomes evident that most reforms have not been implemented systematically, and that the fundamental linguistic and other basic rights of the Kurdish population in Turkey have not been granted. Amendments to the 1982 Constitution have failed to alter an authoritarian Constitution specifically designed to exalt and protect Turkish nationalism, to defend the state against its citizens, and ultimately to preserve the 'indivisibility' of the country. Furthermore, although such reforms have often been presented as radical changes by Turkish officials and may impress many Turks, they often fall short of Kurdish expectations, a people that have had their basic rights denied for a century now, whilst witnessing the recognition of Kurdish as an official language across the border in Iraq. Thus, the contradictory reform process creates confusion, and it is therefore important to look closer at the linguistic reforms of the current government to decode the transformation of Turkey's Kurdish language policy from a policy of denial to one of semi-recognition.

The early 'Harmonisation Laws' that Turkey carried out in 2001 as part of the EU membership process amended parts of the 1982 Constitution and other legislation, with Turkey pledging to improve the human, cultural, and linguistic rights of its citizens 'irrespective of their origin' (Eraydın-Virtanen 2003: 34). One significant reform was the amendment of Article 26 of the 1982 Constitution, entitled 'Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought', where the phrase 'language prohibited by law' had primarily been used to prosecute Kurdish speakers. Furthermore, the section of Article 28 of the Constitution that reads, 'Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law', was also deleted. Such amendments enabled radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish:

Although Turkish will be the basis of TV and radio broadcasts, broadcasts in different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives is made possible. Furthermore, it has been emphasised that such broadcasts cannot be against the fundamental principles in the Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation.

(KHRP 2005: 17)

The 2003 'Law on Teaching in Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives' enabled broadcasting and private language courses to be established in 'non-official languages' (Bianet 2003). However, several limitations were deployed in the law, making it practically impossible to run a private Kurdish course: the duration of courses was limited to ten weeks, with a maximum of 18 hours of classes per week, and unrealistic classroom and building regulations were imposed. Those who attempted to launch courses in Kurdish faced a wall of bureaucratic hostility and unwillingness. It was re-emphasised in the reform package that 'No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education' (Yildiz and Muller 2008: 87–88). In 2004, Turkey's public service broadcaster TRT (*Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*), was permitted to broadcast in Kurdish, albeit with serious limitations: only four hours of Kurdish programming per week, no programs targeting children, and the programming must always contain Turkish subtitles. Further, the Regulation on the Language of Radio and Television Broadcasts made clear that 'No broadcasts can be made towards the teaching of these languages and dialects' (Eraydın-Virtanen 2003: 38). As the European Commission pointed out in its 2007 Progress Report on Turkey: 'Turkey has made no progress in the area of cultural rights. Significant further efforts are required, in particular on use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public services' (Commission of the European Communities 2007). At the same time, no previous Prime Minister had acknowledged and verbalised the Kurdish question in the way that Erdoğan did in his 2005 landmark visit to Diyarbakır, the unofficial capital of the Kurdish region in Turkey. In his speech Erdoğan admitted that Turkey's policy towards its Kurdish citizens had been wrong and that many mistakes had been made. He added that Turkey needed to come to terms with its past, and that only through democracy and with reforms could the Kurdish question be solved (*The Economist* 2005).

One of the more significant steps taken by the AKP was in 2009, when TRT, the country's public service broadcaster, launched TRT6, the first state-run, 24-hour TV channel entirely in Kurdish. TRT6 broadcasts a variety of cultural, historical, and religious programs, including those aimed at children. However, the channel, which lacks constitutional backing, consciously remains dedicated to operate as a 'non-political' channel, and completely ignores the political and cultural demands of the Kurds and the Kurdish national struggle at large. Reports have also emerged that the channel has an internal list of Kurdish words not to be used in broadcasting, since these words have 'political connotations' associated with the PKK (Sterk 2010). Thus, one could potentially be unaware while watching TRT6 that Turkey has been going through a disastrous civil war for the past three decades, or that the Kurdish ethnic identity was denied for most of Turkey's modern history. Consequently, by ignoring Kurdish politics and political demands, as

well as pursuing a pro-government line, TRT6 depoliticizes the Kurds and represents Kurdish culture and language as a mere cultural artefact in the larger ethno-linguistic ‘mosaic’ of Turkey. However, it has to be added that, although TRT6 and various reforms can be interpreted as tactical moves by the AKP to attract Kurdish votes, TRT6 has played an important role in making the Kurds and their language more visible, primarily to Turkish mainstream society, providing a limited legitimacy after decades of denial, denigration, and repression. However, with several other local and international Kurdish satellite TV channels in existence, TRT6 has failed to impress a majority of the Kurdish population by ignoring the politics of the Kurds. Instead, both TRT6 and *Dünya TV*, a private TV channel with links to the pro-AKP Islamist Fetullah Gülen movement in Turkey, have come increasingly to broadcast overtly Islamic content and to deploy an Islamic discourse of ‘brotherhood’ and a religious bond between Turks and Kurds, with the aim of countering rising Kurdish nationalism, as well as the influence of the PKK.<sup>12</sup> This is in line with AKP’s overall aim to restructure Turkey, with its ethnic and sectarian lines, by providing a greater role for Islam as the new ‘social-glue’ to solidify the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism (Yavuz and Özcan 2007).

This contradictory and problematic approach to the Kurds and the Kurdish question became most evident when the AKP government launched its ‘Kurdish initiative’ in 2009, with the aim of solving the Kurdish question that had haunted Turkey since its creation as a nation-state. In a speech, President Abdullah Gül defined the Kurdish question as the most important problem of the country. This was followed by Erdoğan, who in an emotional speech launched the initiative, urging all the parties in Turkey to support it. Nationalist circles strongly criticised the government, accusing it of ‘treason’ and of giving in to ‘terrorist demands’, while liberal circles and some Kurds supported the initiative. Despite strong opposition, the AKP government stated its determination to carry out reforms to alleviate the Kurds’ demands, as they had done by launching TRT6. The government announced that the initiative would result in the ‘surrender’ or ‘reintegration’ of PKK fighters back into the society and remove restrictions facing the Kurdish language, identity, and culture. In parallel, regional investment and development would be intensified in the Kurdish areas, especially through welfare provisions and social assistance. According to AKP officials, the initiative was part of the overall process of democratising Turkey, which also required the drafting of a new Constitution, and reigniting membership negotiations with the EU (Casier, Jongerden and Walker 2011).

Soon after the launch of the initiative, Turkey’s Higher Education Board (*Yüksek Eğitim Kurulu, YÖK*) approved the application of Artuklu University in the multi-ethnic city of Mardin to establish the somehow ironically titled ‘Institute of Living Languages’ to provide postgraduate education in Kurdish, as well as in other regional languages. The institute has since published Kurdish textbooks and classics and organised various conferences on

Kurdish history and language. However, in late 2012, the institute had run into disagreement with AKP officials over the post-graduate Kurdish programs (Yöneş 2012), and over whether Zazaki was a separate language or a dialect of Kurdish (*Radikal* 2012b).

Similar problems that haunted earlier reforms also affected the ‘Kurdish Initiative’, with the AKP government backtracking for fear of ceding control to the PKK over developments on the ground and of losing votes to nationalist parties because of its reforms. By the end of 2009, whatever credibility the initiative had was lost, and hopes raised for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question were dashed when Turkey’s Constitutional Court banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*, DTP) for having become the ‘focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation’ (Önderođlu 2009). The ‘Kurdish initiative’ was soon re-packaged into the ‘National unity and brotherhood project’, and it instead became an aspect of the problem of the ‘democratisation’ of Turkey and of respect for its ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘ethnic mosaic’, thus ignoring the collective and regional demands of the Kurds. The government continues to strategically deploy the discourse of ‘reform’ and ‘service’ (*hizmet*) and has declared that they will continue unabated. Although the government has argued that programs of social assistance in the Kurdish region are aimed at development, Yörük (2012) has concluded, for example, that the government deploys welfare provisions to subdue Kurdish unrest, specifically targeting politicised poor Kurds. In terms of Kurdish language rights and amendments to the educational system, Prime Minister Erdoğan announced in June 2012 that Kurdish was to become an elective course in school (*Today’s Zaman* 2012a). In November 2012, the government also presented a draft law to the Parliament allowing prisoners to use Kurdish in their verbal defence in Turkish courts; however, it contained a stipulation that all interpreting costs incurred were to be covered by the defendant (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kanun Tasarısı 2012; see also Bayır in this volume). The chief architect of the ‘initiative’, Mahir Ünal, who is also Chair of the AKP parliamentary group, in fact declared on 19 December 2012 that the government will ‘solve the Kurdish question in two years’, arguing that the reform process would force the PKK to lay down its arms (*Bugün* 2012).

### Reforms or repression?

The suppression of the linguistic, cultural, and political rights of the Kurdish population in Turkey has been endemic, continuing systematically during the AKP’s rule, and it is important to more closely analyse the practices on the ground that have operated in parallel to the official ‘reform process’. For example, while various reforms have indeed made the publication of newspapers and books in Kurdish easier, publications with content that the authorities deem to be ‘terrorist propaganda’ have continued to land

publishers and writers in prison. The case of the only daily newspaper in Kurdish, *Azadiya Welat* (Free Country), is important in this regard. The newspaper has been closed down three times and has had 25 different cases launched against it by prosecutors during the 12 years it has been in publication (KHRP 2005: 22). As of August 2012, 76 journalists were in prison in Turkey, most of them charged with ‘aiding and abetting terrorism’ for having covered the views and activities of the PKK. No other country in the world currently has this many of imprisoned journalists, according to the NGO Committee to Protect Journalists. In its 2012 report, it showed that:

[ ... ]the government conflated reporting favourable to the PKK or other outlawed Kurdish groups with actual assistance to such organizations. Basic newsgathering activities, receiving tips, assigning stories, conducting interviews, relaying information to colleagues, were depicted by prosecutors as engaging in a terrorist enterprise[ ... ]In its effort to suppress Kurdish viewpoints, the government has gone so far as to regulate the use of words themselves. In 2012, the Council of State banned the use on television of the word ‘guerrilla’ in relation to the PKK, saying it would ‘legitimize the terrorists and terrorism’.

(CPJ 2012)

The issue of Kurdish names has been another area in which reforms have not changed the reality on the ground. Following the 2003 amendment to Article 16 of the Registration Law regulating names, it became possible for parents to give Kurdish names to their children. However, such names could not to be ‘subversive’ or contain the letters ‘Q’, ‘W’, or ‘X’, which are commonly used in Kurdish, but do not exist in the Turkish alphabet. Following this reform, hundreds of Kurdish activists launched a campaign to change their names to explicitly Kurdish names, some with Kurdish nationalist connotations, in order to put the new reform to test. Although the reform in question has made it easier for certain Kurdish names to be registered, those containing the letters ‘Q’, ‘W’, and ‘X’ continue to be rejected by the courts (Aslan 2009). Similarly, a seven-year-old German citizen of Kurdish origin, Welat Dağ, was not allowed to enter Turkey with the rest of his family in 2008 because he had a ‘name that is on the list of banned names’ (Başaran 2008). In other words, Kurds continue to face prosecution when registering their names because they are only permitted names that accord with the spelling rules of the Turkish alphabet. This policy is particularly interesting considering that these ‘banned letters’ are in reality an integral part of Turkish life. The fact that a major TV channel is called ‘Show TV’, or that countless companies have the letters ‘Q’ and ‘W’ in their names but are not the target of lawsuits, makes it clear that this policy is specifically deployed to target Kurds in Turkey who insist on demanding their rights and express their ethnic identity. A similar problem also emerges when Kurdish-governed councils want to have Kurdish street

names, and such attempts are heavily clamped down on by the authorities (Gusten 2012). More recently, the Turkish scholar, İsmail Beşikçi, who spent a total of 17 years in prison for his work on the Kurds (van Bruinessen 2005), appeared with his editor before a court in late 2010 to be charged under Article 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Law with making 'propaganda on behalf of a terrorist organisation'. According to the prosecutor, by writing an article about the Kurdish right to self-determination, Beşikçi had spread 'terrorist propaganda'. Interestingly, the prosecutor also cited the fact that Beşikçi had spelt the name of the mountain of Qandil, where the PKK is based in Iraqi Kurdistan, with a 'Q' rather than a 'K', which was deemed evidence of Beşikçi's support for the 'Kurdish alphabet' and therefore support for 'terrorist propaganda' (Reporters Without Borders 2010).

The right to education in Kurdish continues to be at the heart of the Kurdish question in Turkey, with Kurdish politicians demanding the guarantee of this fundamental right, while the government will only consider offering Kurdish as an elective course. This is part of the AKP's policy of demonising Kurdish demands for collective rights as 'separatist', and instead formulating a watered-down 'individual-based' rights policy that fails to meet Kurdish demands. As previously mentioned, the 2003 Law on Teaching in Different Languages and Dialects Traditionally Used by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives enabled the setting up of private language courses in Kurdish, but these courses failed to materialise due to numerous bureaucratic impositions. This is a prime example of the government's making its reforms look sincere on paper, while preventing real changes on the ground. Yet the pro-government TV channels and newspapers often propagandize about the AKP revolution and criticise Kurds for not showing interest in their language and the 'rights' that have been 'given' to them (see, among many, Zaman 2004, 2011). Interestingly, since 2001, Kurdish organisations and individuals had been pursuing a large-scale campaign for public education in Kurdish, which was heavily clamped down on by the authorities for 'voicing the demands of a terrorist organisation'. Various laws, such as Article 169 of the Penal code, were deployed to arrest campaigners for being affiliated with a 'terrorist organisation', and many university students were expelled from their universities for having submitted petitions to the Parliament demanding education in Kurdish (Jones 2002). The case of the 13-year-old Medya Örnek is also of interest in this regard. When she started school, she only spoke Kurdish and could not communicate with either her teacher, or her classmates. At the age of seven, Medya decided to teach Kurdish to her friends who were also Kurdish, but who had not been taught the language. In 2009, the authorities found out about Medya's Kurdish classes in her home, and since she herself was too young to be prosecuted, a case was brought against her parents for 'slandering the Turkish state'. The case was later dropped (Cleek 2012). It must be reiterated that despite the reforms, Article 42 of the Constitution still stipulates that only Turkish can be taught as a mother tongue to citizens of Turkey.

At a time when private TV and radio stations were facing legal harassment for broadcasting in Kurdish, the authorities simultaneously allowed limited broadcasting in Kurdish on the official state channel. Gün TV and radio station in Diyarbakır, for example, has endured difficulties since they started broadcasting in 2004, facing dozens of legal cases. In 2006, its editor was charged under Article 216 of the Penal Code for ‘inciting hatred’ after playing a song on Gün Radio which contained the word ‘Kurdistan’ (Önderoğlu 2007). More recently in 2012, the state media regulator banned Gün TV from broadcasting its news program for a week, and the program host was permanently prohibited from working in broadcasting. The ban came after the state-appointed governor of Diyarbakır made an official complaint against Gün TV for broadcasting ‘terrorist propaganda’ (Öğret and Ognianova 2012). The Turkish authorities have also tried to limit the influence of global satellite TV stations such as Roj TV, which it accuses of functioning as PKK’s official channel. Turkey has banned Roj TV and affiliated channels and used its diplomatic influence to have the station banned in Europe (Wenande 2012). Various Kurdish politicians and activists have faced prosecution for appearing on Roj TV (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2006).

Kurdish politicians have continued to be prosecuted and imprisoned for their politics and their campaign for Kurdish linguistic rights. The example of the mayor of the Sur municipality, Abdullah Demirbaş, is a case in point. While the government was discussing reforms and easing restrictions on the Kurdish language, Demirbaş was dismissed and the municipal council dissolved in 2007 for providing multilingual services to local residents (Korkut 2009). Similarly, Osman Baydemir, the popular mayor of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality has been systematically prosecuted for his speeches in Kurdish, as well as for having sent celebration cards in Kurdish, Turkish, and English during festive seasons. Interestingly, prosecutors wanting to punish Baydemir for having written ‘*Sersala we piroz be*’ (Happy New Year) in Kurdish, and for using the forbidden letter ‘W’, completely ignoring the letter ‘W’ in the English ‘Happy New Year’ message on the cards (Ouald-Chaib 2010).

The recently amended Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006, in which the terms ‘propaganda’ and ‘terrorist organisation’ are not defined, has been systematically deployed in the broadest manner to target Kurdish politicians, journalists, writers, and human rights activists. Thousands of children have also been jailed since 2009 under the Anti-Terror Law, and reports have emerged of torture and rape in prisons (*Today’s Zaman* 2012b). In fact, Turkey’s Interior Minister, Idris Naim Şahin, argued in early 2012 that ‘terrorism’ needed to be defined in a broader way so as to include ‘the backyard that feeds terrorism’, which can range from a poem to a painting or ‘a university chair, an association, or a non-governmental organization’ (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2011). Accordingly, Turkey has the largest share in the world of people who have been convicted of ‘terror crimes’ since the 11 September attacks in

2001 (Bianet 2011b). In November 2012, steps were taken in the Turkish Parliament to remove the immunity of Kurdish deputies in order for them to be prosecuted for their alleged ‘ties’ to the PKK (Aydinli 2012).

Such examples show the highly contradictory and inconsistent nature of the AKP’s reform process, which fails to make real changes for Kurds or to meet Kurdish expectations at a time when Kurds are achieving increased self-rule and autonomy in neighbouring Iraq and Syria, and indeed when Kurdish is recognised as an official language of Iraq. Currently, thousands of Kurdish politicians, lawyers, academics, writers, journalists, activists, and students remain imprisoned on ‘terrorism’ charges since 2009, when the ‘Kurdish Initiative’ was launched (Hess 2012). Waves of operations and arrests have incarcerated a large section of the Kurdish political cadres in Turkey. They are being indicted for being members of the urban wing of the PKK and for attempting to establish an alternative structure to the Turkish state in the Kurdish region. As always, language has been at the centre of the ensuing political crisis. Throughout these show-trials, many defendants have refused to speak Turkish, wishing to defend themselves in their Kurdish mother tongue. The courts in question have rejected this on the grounds that the defendants can speak Turkish. This has at times resulted in microphones being switched off when defendants have spoken in Kurdish, with the proceedings recorded as taking place ‘in an unknown language’ (Üstündağ 2010; see also Bayır in this volume). On 12 September 2012, the anniversary of the 1980 military coup, thousands of political prisoners launched a hunger strike which lasted 68 days, causing a crisis in Turkey. Among the demands of the political prisoners was the right to use Kurdish in the courts and public sphere without hindrance (Hess 2012). Again, the issue of language was at the heart of politics in Turkey. It was following this crisis that the government presented a draft law to Parliament in November 2012 allowing Kurdish to be used by defendants during their verbal defence in Turkish courts.

A similar disregard for Kurdish has also taken place in the Turkish Parliament when Kurdish MPs have used their mother tongue in speeches and this has been recorded in the proceedings as carried out in an ‘unknown’ or ‘incomprehensible’ language. Such invalidation within the highest political arena is a telling example of the true status of the Kurdish language in Turkey. This practice has only ever been applied to Kurdish politicians, as prominent foreign leaders have given speeches in other languages in Parliament without hindrance, e.g., American President Bill Clinton in 1999. Another sign of the disparity in official attitudes toward Kurdish occurred in 2012, when Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, was invited as a guest speaker to the ruling AKP’s annual party conference and delivered his speech in Kurdish (Reuters 2012).

With three landslide victories, which is unprecedented in Turkish history, the AKP has managed to consolidate its power and significantly decrease the influence of the Kemalist military’s tutelage in politics. Yet, militarism itself

continues to be hegemonic and embedded in all aspects of Turkish life, and the AKP has not shied away from pursuing a traditional state policy when it comes to the Kurdish question. Despite receiving the support of a majority of the population, including many Kurdish votes, the on-and-off-reform process since the AKP came to power remains superficial, and the Kurdish question continues to be imprisoned within the confines of the militarist security discourse. Although the AKP is the only Turkish government to have taken any steps regarding the Kurdish question, and the first to carry out negotiations with the PKK, which a peaceful solution requires, its vision remains confined to a nationalist, militarist, and populist framework, which has prevented the AKP from taking genuine steps to offer a sincere and lasting solution to the Kurdish question. As Çiçek rightly points out in this volume: ‘the AKP’s ideological-political characteristics and administrative capacity have not been sufficient to resolve the decades-old Kurdish issue and to disarm the PKK.’

A serious problem throughout the reform process has been that the AKP government’s reforms do not correspond to the demands and expectations of the majority of Kurds in Turkey. The government has strictly avoided responding to actual Kurdish demands for collective rights, education in Kurdish, a general amnesty, release of the PKK leader Öcalan, or, most importantly, a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in the form of regional autonomy. Not only has the government chosen to ignore such fundamental demands, it has also chosen a confrontational path to solve the Kurdish question by bypassing and clamping down not only on the PKK but also on the democratically elected representatives of the Kurds. Accordingly, the reform process has been highly fragile and severely criticised for being a half-hearted attempt to patch up an authoritarian Constitution and for carrying out legal amendments that aim to improve the democratic credentials of Turkey, while at the same time breach the fundamental human rights of its citizens. Therefore, instead of winning over a large section of the Kurdish population through strategies such as TRT6 and the Kurdish initiative, the AKP has instead alienated significant swathes of the Kurdish geography that initially supported the governments’ efforts. In fact, as Çiçek has underlined in this volume, ‘one of the main aims of the democratic initiative has been to marginalize pro-Kurdish politics in Turkey, rather than to resolve the Kurdish issue and disarm the PKK with a process based on the negotiation and enlarging political arena.’ A similar important point is made by Alisa Marcus, who comments:

The graduate programs in Kurdish-language studies were not poorly received, it’s just that with so many students and some professors in prison, it’s hard to know who will teach the classes, or take them. Elective Kurdish-language courses might be a good idea for Turkish students, but Kurds want their children to learn in their own language, not learn about it. And allowing families to speak Kurdish to their children

on visiting day in prison is great. But letting them out of prison would be even better.

(Marcus 2012)

The AKP is still psychologically governed by the nationalist framing of a monolithic and unchanging Turkish national identity, but under AKP rule with an Islamic tinge. The AKP strategy towards Kurdish politics has, like previous governments, been to suppress Kurdish politics and dilute Kurdish demands so as not to challenge the nationalist status quo in Turkey. Turkish nationalism, which has historically been coded to deny Kurdish rights, continues to be the common denominator in all Turkish politics in Turkey, preventing a genuine process of peace and reconciliation. To this day, the AKP government still seems to be dominated by a vision of ‘solving’ the Kurdish question without actually involving the Kurds.

### **Conclusion remarks**

There is overwhelming evidence that, ever since its establishment, the Turkish nation-state has pursued a policy of linguistic genocide against Kurds and other ethno-religious groups. For several decades, Turkish official discourse maintained that there were no Kurds in Turkey, and it mobilised all its institutions and symbolic and physical power to prove that this was the case. Since the Kurds did not exist, there could also be no language called Kurdish or a problem called the Kurdish question. This systematic policy of denial was part of the project to create a homogenous nation of Turkish speakers. Since the early 1990s, the policy of denial has become untenable in the face of Kurdish mobilization and resistance alongside the impact of global changes and influences, such as the EU membership process. Accordingly, various Turkish policy-makers have carried out reforms, particularly under the AKP government, which can be said to have taken the bravest steps so far through the acknowledgement of Kurdish grievances and the initiation of language reforms. Yet, as this chapter has revealed, many of these reforms have failed to be implemented or have been contradicted by the practice on the ground, where systematic breaches of Kurdish linguistic rights have continued. There remain deeply entrenched political, legal, and psychological obstacles threatening the survival of the Kurdish language in Turkey. Speakers of Kurdish in Turkey are still prevented from learning their language and from passing it on to the next generation. Article 42 of the Constitution still contains the stipulation that ‘no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens’, thus preventing Kurdish from being used as a language of education. As this chapter has revealed, officials continue to ignore the linguistic demands of the majority of Kurds and insist on viewing Kurdish linguistic rights and the Kurdish question through the prism of ‘national security and unity’. The enduring existence of the Kurdish language is a persistent ‘problem’ for the

political elite, and it remains an ‘obstacle’ and a ‘threat’ to the official vision of Turkish ethnic and linguistic dominance.

AKP rule has ended the traditional state policy of denial concerning Kurds, but is strongly informed by the same nationalist, statist, and militarist tradition. Despite its electoral successes, reforms, and challenge to the military’s role in politics, the AKP’s overtures on the Kurdish question have failed to deliver. Raised hopes and expectations for a freer and more democratic Turkey finally at peace with its past and the diversity of its own society, have been dampened by the political reality of the past few years. Since 2009, it has been evident that the AKP lacks the democratic credentials to bring about crucial, meaningful change in Turkey. While periodically deploying a less rigid discourse and strategy with regard to the Kurds, it ultimately caricatures and minimizes historical Kurdish demands for collective rights into ‘certain problems of our citizens of Kurdish origin’ to be resolved through ‘hand outs’ in return for Kurdish loyalty to the new Turkish-Islamic national identity. Thus, the AKP’s Kurdish policy and reforms can be summed up as certain limited legal amendments and an easing of traditional state policy, in return for Kurdish obedience and the cessation of demands for collective and administrative rights, such as regional autonomy. The AKP government has hoped to solve the Kurdish question and subsequently gain Kurdish votes by meting out watered down ‘rights’ while trying to exclude or silence Kurdish politicians, and even these minimal rights have failed to be implemented satisfactorily. A lasting solution cannot be found by disregarding basic human and linguistic rights or by bypassing democratic avenues. Sadly, it seems fundamental issues of language will remain on Turkey’s agenda for the foreseeable future.

## Notes

- 1 I have discussed the first aspect in Zeydanhoğlu 2012. For a detailed analysis of the policy of modernisation and purification of the Turkish language, see also Lewis 1999; Sadoğlu 2003.
- 2 For a detailed analysis of the Kurdish response to these policies and the Kurdish mobilisation around linguistic rights, see Öpengin 2012, Uçarlar 2009.
- 3 My translation. The video can be accessed online here: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RViaxd5NSQ>.
- 4 The number of Kurds in Turkey, as well as in Iran, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, remains a matter of debate. The population of Kurds in Turkey is estimated to be somewhere between 15 and 20 million. Despite the social-engineering policies of the Turkish state, the majority of the Kurds in Turkey continue to reside in their historical homeland, Kurdistan, or the eastern regions of the Turkey. Due to both forced and voluntary migration, significant numbers of Kurds also reside in major Turkish cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, and Mersin (Hassanpour 1992, 1993; Öpengin 2012).
- 5 The Kurds in Turkey speak two different dialects of Kurdish, Kurmanji and Zazaki, with the former being spoken by the majority of Kurds. For reasons of practicality, this chapter will refer to the Kurdish language when speaking of any of the dialects spoken by the Kurds in Turkey or elsewhere (Hassanpour 1992, 1993; Öpengin 2012).

- 6 For the Treaty of Lausanne see: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty.en.mfa>. For the Treaty of Sèvres see: [http://www.pollitecon.com/html/treaties/Treaty\\_Of\\_Sevres\\_1.htm](http://www.pollitecon.com/html/treaties/Treaty_Of_Sevres_1.htm).
- 7 For a detailed analysis of minorities and their status in Turkey, see Bayır in this volume.
- 8 For the concept of ‘invisibilisation’ with regards to the Kurdish language in Turkey, see Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Haig 2004.
- 9 For the Turkish original of the 1982 Constitution and a description of all the amendments to date, see: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm>. For the English version, see: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982constitution.htm>.
- 10 For the Law on Political Parties see the website of the Turkish Parliament: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/2820sk.htm>.
- 11 The Anti-Terror Law 3713 can be accessed online at: [http://www.justice.gov.tr/basiclaws/Law\\_on\\_Figh.pdf](http://www.justice.gov.tr/basiclaws/Law_on_Figh.pdf).
- 12 For a detailed analysis of the Kurdish national movement, see Gunes 2012.

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